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Temporal Stability and Geographic Variation
in Cumulative Case Fatality Rates and Average
Doubling Times of SARS Epidemics
Alison P. Galvani, Xiudong Lei, and Nicholas P. Jewell
Abstract
We analyze temporal stability and geographic trends in cumulative case fatality
rates and average doubling times of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
In part, we account for correlations between case fatality rates and doubling times
through differences in control measures. We discuss factors that may alter fu-
ture estimates of case fatality rates. We also discuss reasons for heterogeneity in
doubling times among countries and the implications for the control of SARS in
different countries and parameterization of epidemic models.
 1 
Temporal stability and geographic variation in cumulative case fatality rates and 
average doubling times of SARS epidemics 
 
 
Concern over the emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) persists as the 
epidemic continues despite control efforts. As of May 12, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) had reported 7447 cases of SARS, with 552 deaths, scattered over more than 30 
countries. The most affected locations have been China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Viet 
Nam, Taiwan and Canada, which we focus on here. Doubling times and case fatality rates 
are fundamental to the epidemiology and potential public health impact of SARS. Case 
fatality rates (CFRs) are defined as the proportion of cases that are fatal. The doubling 
time is the period required for the epidemic to double, and is thus a measure of the rate of 
spread of disease. Doubling times also indicate the magnitude of control effort required to 
curtail spread. It is important to stress that doubling times change substantially over the 
course of an epidemic so that it is inappropriate to use current estimates to extrapolate 
into the future. 
Case fatality rates of SARS have typically been estimated by dividing the number 
of fatalities by the total number of cases. This method is sufficient for an advanced 
epidemic. However, the method is not accurate at an early stage of an epidemic, 
particularly when the time from infection to recovery/death is not short relative to the 
duration of the epidemic, as is currently the case for SARS. The method underestimates 
case fatality, because it does not take into account that a proportion of individuals who 
are currently infected will die from the disease. A more accurate method is to divide the 
number of deaths by the total number of deaths + recovered. Applying this method to 
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publicly available WHO data (1), stability in the cumulative CFR estimates emerge, with 
relatively constant CFRs within a country (aside from Taiwan which is in the very 
earliest stage of its epidemic), but with considerable heterogeneity among countries 
(Figure 1A).   
Overall, CFR averaged over all countries has grown from 10.4% on April 21 to 
14.7% on May 12 (largely due to the sudden jump in CFR in China and Taiwan over this 
period). In countries with few deaths this estimate of CFR may be a slight overestimate if 
time from infection to death tends to be less than time to recovery. However, recent 
cohort data from Hong Kong (2) suggest the opposite implying that our crude estimates 
of CFR may still be underestimates. Such inaccuracies are however unlikely to modify 
the general comparison of CFRs across countries discussed below. Nevertheless, caution 
must be used in comparing CFRs across countries since there may be differences in the 
various surveillance systems that report cases and the number recovered. 
Note that Figure 1A does not directly provide information on whether the CFR 
shows temporal trends in any country as it plots the average CFR since the beginning of 
the epidemics. Unfortunately, the publicly available WHO data does not permit 
estimation of a CFR over time since cases reported in one time period are not linked to 
recoveries at the same or future time. Determination of factors, including date of 
infection,  that influence fatality rates await detailed analyses of cohort data on infected 
individuals.   
We identify an inverse relationship between the average CFR and the average 
doubling time for different countries (Figure 1B). (The average doubling time is a 
cumulative measure reflecting average growth from the beginning of reported data, and is 
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estimated by the length of a time period divided by the log2 of the relative growth in 
reported cases over the same period—see Appendix).  
  This relationship is probably generated by the influence of the efficacy of control 
policy affecting both parameters, rather than a reflection of different characteristics of 
viral infectiousness and virulence across epidemics. Rapid hospitalization of infectious 
individuals is likely both to reduce the CFR and to increase the doubling time (by 
reducing the spread of SARS). Consistent with this explanation is the successful 
containment of a sizable epidemic in Viet Nam and the relatively low CFR and long 
doubling time there. In contrast, Canada has the highest CFR and shortest doubling time 
(not counting Taiwan where the CFR has yet to reach a steady state). Stochasticity in 
personal contacts plays a key role during the invasion phase of the epidemic. In Toronto 
it resulted in a second outbreak after public health officials had thought that SARS had 
been controlled. Transmission also occurred in Toronto before public awareness of SARS 
was widespread, resulting in a delay in the hospitalization of the first few cases that in 
turn facilitated transmission and may have elevated fatality rates (3). In other words, the 
means of disease introduction may be important in determining early doubling times and 
CFR values. These factors, combined with small sample sizes, may be the cause of 
particularly high CFRs from April 10 to 15th in Canada; it remains to be seen whether 
high CFRs can be attributed to alternative explanations.  
Variation in CFRs among countries will arise from differences in intensity and 
rapidity of medical care, age-structure (older infected patients are more likely to die, (2)) 
and other factors such as coinfection. For example, the high prevalence of coinfection 
with other respiratory diseases, such as Chlamydia pneumoniae (4), C. psittaci and 
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paramyxoviruses in China could increase the CFR there. Likewise, should it spread in 
Africa, SARS could have a devastating effect, given the high prevalence of tuberculosis 
and HIV/AIDS, although the impact of such concomitant infections on SARS 
susceptibility and outcome remains to be studied. 
Estimates of CFR may change as polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assays become 
more widely used in diagnosis (5). Diagnostic tests could identify mild cases of SARS 
currently escaping notification. This would increase our estimate of the size of the 
epidemic in terms of number of cases, but would reduce estimates of the CFR. In the 
other direction, PCR tests might eliminate SARS as a cause in some suspected cases. 
Ultimately, accurate estimates of population distributions of parameters reflecting the 
clinical course of disease will be best provided by follow-up of clearly defined cohorts of 
infected individuals identified by appropriate diagnostic procedures.  
As an epidemic declines, the doubling time increases. Variation in doubling time 
among countries probably arises from variation in both transmission rates and control 
efforts (Figure 1C). Transmission rate (with units of time-1) is determined by the expected 
number of susceptibles each infectious individual contacts during a unit period of time in 
their infectious periods, and by the probability of disease transmission per contact. High-
density population centers, crowded public transport and hospital waiting rooms, enhance 
number of contacts, while personal hygiene affects the probability of transmission per 
contact. In all countries, seasonal effects may also play a substantial role with increased 
spread in winter as compared to late spring and summer months, as in the case of 
influenza transmission.  
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In Viet Nam, the doubling time increased over the time that the epidemic was 
being controlled (Figure 1C). The dramatic drop in doubling time in China in early April 
corresponds to a change in reporting practices (Figure 1C). Similarly, in the US, a shift in 
the definition of a SARS case to correspond to that recommended by the WHO 
complicates estimation of doubling time. However, the US appears to have a longer 
doubling time, because most cases are due to seeding from travel to Asia, with few cases 
from local chains of transmission.  
Epidemic models may provide a framework for evaluating alternative control 
measures. Central to the accurate parameterization of epidemic models is the 
reproductive ratio, R0, which is the average number of secondary cases generated by one 
initial infection in a susceptible population, and in the absence of control measures (6). R0 
defines a threshold that determines whether an infection is likely to spread. If R0 is less 
than one, each infection will not replace itself, on average, and the disease will likely die 
out, although in such cases spatial dynamics, latency, and stochastic variation may all 
contribute to localized flare-ups of the disease that may persist for a considerable length 
of time. Thus, R0 also defines the level of intervention required to contain an epidemic. 
The doubling rate can be used to calculate R0 given that ( ) ταγ /2ln10 ++=R  where γ is 
the duration of the incubating period, α is the duration of the symptomatic period and τ is 
the doubling time (6). Accurate characterization of the incubation and symptomatic 
periods is essential to the translation of doubling times to R0.  Typical estimates of the 
incubation period for SARS range from about 2 to 10 days, with both a mean and a 
median of about 5 days (3; 7), while the symptomatic period has a mean (± SD) of 16 ± 8 
days (3; 7). Recent data from Hong Kong (2) suggests somewhat longer incubation on 
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average. However, severe infections may be over-represented in current estimates. 
Published estimates have been based largely on individuals who have received intensive 
medical treatment, another factor that may affect the symptomatic period. At this point in 
any of the epidemics, we are reluctant to use this approach for calculation of R0 from 
doubling times since the latter is confounded by evolving control policies (e.g. Hong 
Kong, Toronto); the most natural epidemic (in Guangdong) offers the least complete data.  
Figure 2 plots the reported case counts in China together with an exponential 
curve fitted to a smooth version of the counts (to allow for the discreteness in reports in 
early April). The estimated doubling time from this curve is 16.2 (which closely matches 
the May 3 value for China in Fig 1C which is 16.3—the May 12 doubling time is now 
17.7 as the growth in counts has declined in the 9 days since May 3); note that the curve 
suggests that 502 cases existed in China on March 17 (with a 95% confidence interval of 
(468, 538)) (Appendix), consistent with under-reporting at that time. We again stress that 
control measures, evolving contact patterns, stochastic effects and potential acquired 
immunity will all impact this doubling time (equivalently, the growth in case counts) in 
the future, and will ultimately lead to a flattening of the growth observed to date. The 
lack of fit of a simple exponential curve can be already seen in the last week of data from 
China. 
This rapid growth in China suggests an urgent need to control the epidemic in 
Asia before it gains further momentum. Containment of an outbreak at an early stage 
affords a greater chance of success than does a later response, and the former clearly puts 
less strain on the health care system. Isolation of cases, infection-control measures in 
hospitals, and vigilant surveillance at community and population levels are imperative.  
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Failing this, SARS could become endemic in China, particularly if it evolves 
antigenically to evade pre-existing immunity, such that recovered patients could be 
reinfected, as is the case for influenza (8). In this eventuality, international travel would 
continually seed new cases in other parts of the world. SARS reaffirms what we have 
previously learned from other infectious diseases, namely that epidemic control is a 
global concern and not the problem of one or a few nations. 
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Appendix 
Definition of doubling time  
The average doubling time over the interval from time t0 to time t1 is simply  
 
where N1 and N0 are the number of cases at times t1 and t0, respectively. The units 
correspond to those used to measure the interval length t1-t0. As an example, if N1 = 2N0, 
then the average doubling time is exactly t1-t0. In Figures 1B and 1C, the time t0 (in days) 
is always taken to be the earliest time where case counts are available in the WHO data. 
 
Analysis of SARS data of China  
Figure 2 was obtained by (i) first applying a lowess smooth (9) to the observed case 
counts,  (ii) applying  least squares linear fit of the logarithm of the smoothed case counts 
against time, and (iii) transforming the fitted line back to the original scale . In particular, 
in (ii) the estimated line is 
log(case) = 6.176 + 0.0427*time 
(where time in days ranges inclusively from the value 1 (March 17) to 57 (May 12). The 
squared correlation coefficients are: 2R  =0.98 (for the original cumulative case counts 
and the lowess smoothed counts), 2R  =0.95 (for the lowess smoothed counts and the 
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fitted counts), and 2R  =0.91 (for the original cumulative case counts and the fitted 
counts). 
 
R square for the lowess smoothed case counts and the fitted counts (from the exponential 
curve) is 95.39%  
 
Prediction of cases with 95% confidence interval for March 17, 2003 
The predicted confidence interval for Y(new) is as following: 
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The estimates and confidence intervals are then transformed back to the original scale. 
 
On March 17, 2003, the estimated case is 502, with a 95% confidence interval (468, 
538)—note that this confidence interval is for the actual number of cases on March 17. 
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Figure 1A: Time series of cumulative case fatality rate.  
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Figure 1B: Cumulative case fatality rate against average doubling time as of May 12, 
2003 
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Figure 1C.  Time series of log of average doubling time 
 
1.00
10.00
100.00
1000.00
3/18 3/21 3/24 3/27 3/30 4/2 4/5 4/8 4/11 4/14 4/17 4/20 4/23 4/26 4/29 5/2 5/5 5/8 5/11
Date (2003)
D
ou
bl
in
g 
Ti
m
e 
(d
ay
s)
Canada China (Mainland) Hong Kong (China) Singapore
Taiwan (China) United States Viet Nam  
 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 14 
Figure 2: Observed and expected cumulative number of SARS cases in China  
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